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 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Abdoulaye Diallo appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and his counsel 
moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence and will 
grant the motion to withdraw. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A superseding indictment charged Diallo with six counts of fraud and aiding and 
abetting fraud concerning the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (“SNAP”), in 
violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, six counts of wire fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of conspiracy to commit those offenses, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371.   
Diallo owned Brothers Food Market in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  He enrolled 
his store in SNAP, which is sometimes called the food stamp program and is a federally 
funded means to provide assistance to low-income individuals and families so that they 
can purchase food.  He participated in the program from September 10, 2011, to February 
4, 2015.  As part of the application process, Diallo received training on how the program 
works, acknowledged in writing that he understood and agreed that he could not 
“[t]rad[e] cash for food stamp benefits[,]” (App. at 600), and acknowledged in writing 
that “[he was] the person responsible for any action taking place in [his] store,” (App. at 
603). 
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At trial, the government presented substantial evidence of its undercover 
investigation, which revealed a two-person scheme of fraudulent SNAP transactions at 
Brothers Food Market.  On six different days, undercover agents obtained cash rather 
than food in exchange for SNAP benefits at the store.  On each occasion, the agents 
received in cash approximately half the value of SNAP benefits charged to the 
government.  
In addition to that evidence, Diallo’s co-conspirator, Lassana Nianghane, testified 
for the government about the scheme he and Diallo used to trade SNAP benefits at a 
discount for cash.  Nianghane testified that he was a street vendor who sold purses.  
When a customer would ask to exchange SNAP benefits for cash, Nianghane would take 
the customer’s SNAP electronic benefits transfer card (“EBT card”) and corresponding 
personal identification number (“PIN”), then he would call Diallo so that Diallo could 
charge the card.  Because the information was being relayed to Diallo by phone, he did 
not have use of the EBT card to charge the SNAP account, so the fraudulent transactions 
were regularly processed by Diallo manually.  Nianghane would give the customer cash 
in an amount that was about half the amount of the EBT charge, that discount being “the 
law of the street.”  (App. at 286.)  
Nianghane testified that he and Diallo would split the resulting profit, with Diallo 
taking 60% and Nianghane getting 40%.  He also corroborated each of the six 
transactions with the undercover investigators and testified that, while he was out of the 
country for most of June 2013 and November 2014, no one took his place in the scheme 
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with Diallo.  Records from the United States Customs and Border Protection confirmed 
Nianghane’s travel outside the United States during those months.   
The government also presented electronic records of the SNAP transactions that 
occurred at Brothers Food Market between September 2011 and December 2015.  A 
summary of the records showed that a high percentage of the dollar volume from SNAP 
transactions were processed manually and that there was a drop in the number of manual 
transactions in the months when Nianghane was out of the country.  Diallo offered no 
evidence, and the jury convicted him on all counts.   
At sentencing, Diallo did not object to the presentence investigation report 
(“PSR”), and the Court adopted the PSR’s method of calculating the fraud loss by 
estimating the dollar volume of SNAP transactions that were manually entered and 
connected to Nianghane.  Based on evidence admitted at trial, the average monthly 
manual dollar volume when the scheme was active was $26,705.86.  The average 
monthly manual dollar volume when the scheme was inactive was $765.82.  The 
difference between those averages was $25,940.03 and represented the average monthly 
dollar volume due to the fraud.  The scheme was active for forty-one months.1  The PSR 
calculated the government’s loss from the scheme by multiplying the average monthly 
                                              
1  The scheme was active from September 2011 through March 2015, but not 
when Nianghane was out of the country in June 2013 and November 2014, which is a 
total of forty-one months.   
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dollar volume due to the fraud by the number of months that the scheme was active, 
resulting in a total of $1,063,541.23.2   
After considering the traditional sentencing factors, the District Court imposed a 
sentence of forty-two months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a 
special assessment of $1300, and restitution of $1,063,541.  Diallo timely appealed, and 
the Court appointed new counsel for him on appeal.   
II.  DISCUSSION3 
 
As allowed by Anders, a criminal defendant’s counsel may seek to withdraw from 
representing the defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous issues to address.  386 
U.S. at 744.  When Anders is invoked, first, we determine whether counsel has  
“adequately fulfilled” the requirements of our Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a),4 and, 
second, we examine “whether an independent review of the record presents any 
                                              
2 The PSR incorrectly transposed the digits in tenths and hundredths places, 
thereby overstating the total fraud loss amount by eleven cents, but that de minimis 
mistake was eliminated because the Court based its sentence and restitution on a loss 
amount rounded down to the nearest whole dollar, that is, $1,063,541.   
 
3  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
4  The Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states: 
 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the 
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion 
to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the United States.  
The United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant may also file a 
brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the clerk will refer 
the case to a merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, 
it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without 
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nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Whether 
an issue is frivolous is informed by the standard of review for each potential claim raised.  
See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding issue on 
appeal would be frivolous when reviewed for plain error).   
At the first step of our review of an Anders brief, we consider whether counsel has 
satisfactorily established that he or she “has thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues” and “explain[ed] why [those] issues are frivolous.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 
300.  Although “[c]ounsel need not raise and reject every possible claim[,] ... at a 
minimum, he or she must meet the ‘conscientious examination’ standard set forth in 
Anders.”  Id. (citation omitted).  If the Anders brief appears adequate on its face, then, at 
the second step of our review, we will “confine our scrutiny to those portions of the 
record identified by ... [the] Anders brief” and “those issues raised in Appellant’s pro se 
brief.”  Id. at 301.  Regardless of the adequacy of the Anders brief, we may affirm the 
conviction and sentence without appointing new counsel, if we find that “the appeal is 
patently frivolous.”  United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 
A. Counsel’s Anders Brief Is Adequate, And Our Independent Review 
Reveals No Nonfrivolous Issues. 
 
                                              
appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds arguable merit to the appeal, or 
that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its review, it will 
appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and restore the case 
to the calendar.  The panel will also determine whether to continue the 
appointment of current counsel or to direct the clerk to discharge current 
counsel and appoint new counsel. 
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The first step of our review reveals that counsel’s Anders brief contains an 
adequate examination of the record and of issues that arguably might support an appeal.  
Counsel represents that he has reviewed Diallo’s case and concluded that it lacks any 
nonfrivolous issue because of the following: all of Diallo’s objections at trial were 
sustained; there were no issues of plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
52; the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained one government 
objection at trial; there were no unresolved defense objections to the PSR; the District 
Court considered the sentencing factors as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the sentence 
was calculated correctly; and the evidence at trial against Diallo was substantial, 
including thoroughly corroborated testimony from Diallo’s co-conspirator.  We are 
satisfied that counsel has correctly assessed the record.   
Because counsel’s Anders brief is adequate, at the second step of our inquiry, we 
only review the portions of the record identified in the Anders and pro se briefs.  Our 
examination of the record relating to the issues raised by counsel reveals no nonfrivolous 
arguments.  We therefore limit further inquiry to the issues in Diallo’s pro se brief. 
B. Diallo’s Pro Se Brief Does Not Raise Any Nonfrivolous Arguments. 
 
In his pro se brief, Diallo raises three issues.  First, he argues that the 
government’s evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he knew about the alleged 
fraudulent SNAP transactions.  Second, he says that the government’s pre-indictment 
delay in prosecuting prejudiced him for purposes of sentencing.  And third, he argues that 
the Court’s calculation of the loss amount for purposes of sentencing was flawed.  We 
review each of those for plain error because he failed to lodge any objection to them at 
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the District Court.5  See United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We 
review an unpreserved objection for plain error.” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying plain error review to defendant’s 
contention, for first time on appeal, that the district court should have used a different 
method for calculating loss amount).  All of Diallo’s claims are frivolous. 
1. The Government’s Evidence At Trial Was Sufficient To Prove 
That Diallo Knew About Fraudulent SNAP Transactions. 
 
Diallo contends that “the Government failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knew ... that the SNAP transactions 
... were illegal transactions[.]”  (Pro Se Br. at 11.)  That claim cannot survive plain error 
review. 
“[I]n reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we must examine the totality 
of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial.”  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 62 
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The burden on a 
defendant who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high[,]” 
and “the government may defeat a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on 
circumstantial evidence alone.”  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir. 
2008).  In making our determination, we “interpret the evidence in the light most 
                                              
5  “A plain error has occurred when there is (1) [an] error, (2) that is plain or 
obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”  United States v. Wilson, 
880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  “If all three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [our] discretion 
to notice a forfeited error, but only if ... the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted). 
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favorable to the government ... and do not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of 
witnesses[.]”  Miller, 527 F.3d at 60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
“[W]e must uphold a jury’s verdict if there is substantial evidence from which a rational 
trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
Here, the evidence at trial was more than sufficient for a jury to find that Diallo 
knew of fraudulent SNAP transactions occurring at his store.6  The government presented 
evidence that investigators determined fraudulent SNAP transactions occurred at Diallo’s 
store, that Diallo acknowledged in writing that he was responsible for all SNAP 
transactions at his store, and that Diallo further acknowledged in writing that SNAP 
benefits could not be traded for cash.  Then there was Nianghane’s testimony on Diallo’s 
involvement in the scheme to exchange SNAP benefits for cash.  That testimony alone 
may have been sufficient to convict.  See United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 613 
(7th Cir. 2006) (concluding jury had reasonable evidence to convict grocery store owner 
of wire fraud and food stamp fraud based on testimonial evidence that owner was 
exchanging cash for customers’ benefits).  But it was not alone; it was corroborated by 
evidence from the undercover officers and the evidence of dramatic variation in fraud 
activity when Nianghane was not available to assist Diallo in the scheme.  Because the 
evidence at trial was far more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Diallo 
                                              
6  It is unclear which counts Diallo challenges as having insufficient evidence of 
his knowledge.  Nevertheless, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s 
finding of Diallo’s knowledge of all alleged illegal conduct and, therefore, his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. 
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knew of fraudulent SNAP transactions occurring at his store, his claim to the contrary is 
frivolous. 
2. The Government Did Not Delay Its Prosecution of Diallo, And 
Diallo Was Not Prejudiced. 
 
Diallo next raises a claim of prejudicial pre-indictment delay in violation of his 
due process rights.7  He argues that the government delayed its indictment to charge him 
with a large amount of loss, “which substantially prejudiced him for sentenc[ing] 
purposes.”  (Pro Se Br. at 21-22.)  That claim also fails on plain error review. 
To establish a claim of pre-indictment delay under the Due Process clause, a 
defendant must show “that the government deliberately delayed bringing the indictment 
in order to obtain an improper tactical advantage or to harass him” and “that the delay 
between the crime and the federal indictment actually prejudiced his defense[.]”  United 
States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2000).  “The Due Process Clause does 
not require prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists, or even ... [when] 
the government’s investigation, though incomplete, has assembled sufficient evidence to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 151.  “The mere possibility of prejudice 
inherent in any extended delay,” such as unavailable witnesses or lost evidence, is not 
enough to demonstrate actual prejudice.  United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 168 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
                                              
7  Diallo also claims that pre-indictment delay violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights, but such a claim is not cognizable under the Sixth Amendment.  See United States 
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has 
no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused,’ an event 
that occurred in this case only when the appellees were indicted[.]”). 
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Here, Diallo has not shown that the government deliberately delayed its indictment 
to gain an improper tactical advantage or to harass him.  The investigation included 
undercover exchanges of SNAP benefits for cash on several dates between September 10, 
2011, and February 4, 2015.  The agents used different tactics on different days in their 
investigative efforts to obtain more evidence.  The government was under no obligation 
to indict Diallo as soon as its evidence was sufficient to show probable cause or guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.     
Moreover, Diallo has not claimed that the alleged delay caused him to lose access 
to any evidence, that it made witnesses unavailable, or that it resulted in faded memories.  
He complains that, because the investigation extended over more than three years, the 
government caused him to be liable for a larger loss amount.  That is an odd way to view 
where the responsibility for mounting losses lies.  The loss amount was due to Diallo’s 
choice to continue stealing from the government, not from the government’s efforts to 
gather more evidence before prosecuting him.  There was no prejudicial pre-indictment 
delay, and the claim that there was is also frivolous. 
3. The Court’s Calculation Of The Loss Amount Was Not 
Unreasonable. 
 
Finally, Diallo disagrees with the Court’s method for calculating the loss amount 
for purposes of sentencing.  The loss amount can be calculated as “the amount of money 
the victim has actually lost,” United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted), and it must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, United 
States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2007).  “The court need only make a reasonable 
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estimate of the loss” and “the court’s loss determination is entitled to appropriate 
deference.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C).  
Here, the loss amount in the PSR was a reasonable estimate of the actual loss to 
the government resulting from Diallo’s scheme to exchange SNAP benefits for cash.  
Diallo’s scheme defrauded the government out of the full value of the SNAP benefits 
because SNAP recipients did not receive any food.  Thus, the amount of SNAP benefits 
that Diallo received from fraudulent transactions is a reasonable assessment of the loss to 
the government.   
The calculation method was reasonable because it relied on evidence that was 
admitted at trial, was limited to manual transactions at the Brothers Food Market, 
excluded a reasonable estimate of legitimate manual transactions, and was confined to the 
period when the fraud scheme was active.  Diallo contends that the District Court should 
have used a different method that would have used accounting data from his store and 
those from comparable stores.  But just because there may have been other methods to 
calculate the loss amount does not mean that the Court’s chosen method was 
unreasonable.  Thus, because the loss calculation was plainly reasonable, that claim also 
is frivolous. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 
the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 
